Will the Benefits and Costs of Bovine Growth Hormone be Distributed Fairly? by Tweeten, Luther G.
Will the Benefits and Costs 
of Bovine Growth Hormone 
be Distributed Fairly? 
by 
Luther Tweeten* 
ES01132 
Bovine somatotropin (bST) or growth hormone (bGH) has received more a ante socioeconomic analysis 
than any previous farming technology. However, some dimensions, particularly the distribution of costs and 
benefits of bGH, have not been analyzed. The purpose of this paper is to fill such gaps in knowledge. 
This paper finds that net benefits from bGH would be distributed more equitably in relation to 
consumers' income than are all farm and food technologies or national income. Distribution of impacts among 
regions and farm sizes are also examined. Impacts would not differ much among regions, but large farms would 
benefit more than would small farms from bGH. Nonetheless, the impacts of the technology would be much 
more evenly spread among farms than are most technologies. 
Impacts of bGH 
This section analyzes the distribution ofbGH costs and benefits among consumers, farmers, and regions. 
Distributional impacts cannot be separated from economic efficiency, food safety, and the environment. Hence 
these too are briefly addressed. 
Anderson Professor of Agricultural Marketing, Policy, and Trade, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The 
Ohio State University, Columbus. Presented at conference on EthiCs and Agricultural Biotechnology at Iowa State University, Ames, 
May 22, 1991. Comments of Robert Jacobson and Carl Zulauf are much appreciated. 
1 
Economic Efficiency 
Bovine growth hormone is economically very efficient. Based on the most likely increase in average U.S. 
milk production per cow from bGH, Fallert et a/. (p. 8) estimated a net return to farmers of $2 for each $1 of 
bGH cost. This net return would drop as milk prices would fall and benefits would go to consumers after 
adjustments. 
The expected 15 percent increase in milk per cow and 8 percent net reduction in dairy product costs to 
U.S. consumers would, after adjustments, reduce dairy product consumption costs by $9 per family per year or 
nearly $1 billion to the nation based on 1985 conditions (see Table 1V With this larger "pie" of GNP, in theory 
it is possible to compensate losers so no one is worse off. 
At issue is whether an 8 percent decrease in farm cost per unit of milk will be passed to consumers. 
The traditional populist view is stated by Comstock (p. 331): 
History, again, is a good anecdote for such rhetoric [that farm costs reduced by bGH will be 
passed to consumers]. . •• The facts are that intermediate markets seem to have a way of 
absorbing whatever profits are made when farmers' prices go down. There is little reason to 
think that bGH usage would lower milk prices for the urban poor, or any consumers. 
Comstock's conclusion was based on anecdotal evidence from personal observations. The conclusion is 
contradicted by careful economic analysis which controls for wages, inflation, interest, and other marketing costs 
to determine net transfer of farm prices to the retail level. 
Comprehensive empirical results from Kinnucan and Forker (p. 291) indicate that increases in fann dairy 
product prices are more quickly passed to consumers than decreases in farm prices. But, most importantly, 
Kinnucan and Forker (p. 291) concluded that" ... the decreases in the farm price of milk are eventually passed 
along to consumers." The latter agrees with a more recent analysis of dairy price margins by Novakovic asd with 
a comprehensive analyses of marketing margins for a wide range of agricultural products (Council of Wage and 
Price Stability). 
lrhe estimate assumes that the cost of 24 cents per treated cow per day covers all production and development outlays of bGH 
supplies. The addition to GNP could be larger if net returns to producers of bGH are included and are positive. 
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Another distortion is commodity programs which can keep a reduction in farm costs from being reflected 
in farm-gate milk prices. Using data for 1972 to 1986 fwm the latest USDA (August 1990) Economic Indicators 
series, Figure 1 shows that commodity programs have not shielded farm-gate receipts per cwt from changes in 
costs. Both real costs and receipts increased from 1972 to 1974; from 1980 to 1986 both real costs and receipts 
decreased.2 The simple regression coefficient of receipts per hundredweight as a function of costs over the 1972-
86 period was 1.011 and the adjusted R2 was .81. The coefficient was not significantly different from 1.0, 
indicating that a $1 reduction in costs was associated with a $1 reduction in receipts. Commodity programs 
adjust to costs.3 Evidence in Figure 1 supports the assumptions in Table 1 that production cost savings from 
bGH will be reflected in farm-gate prices after time for adjustment.4 
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Figure 1. Real Economic Receipts and Costs -- The Dairy Industry. 
Source: USDA (August 1990). Adjusted by GNP deflator, 1986 = 100. 
2-ne difference between cost and receipts in Figure 1 is the return to land, management, and risk. Management and risk costs were 
excluded because they were not available. The land cost was excluded to avoid attributing to cost the higher land prices caused by higher 
milk receipts. On the average for the 1972-86 period, all rece1pts exceeded costs other than for management and risk by 14 pe~~:Cnt -a 
· favorable return indeed to management and risk A more typical management return for other fann enterprises is S percent of receipts. 
It also suggests government programs provided some economic rent. 
l:rhe 1990 fann bill sets a minimum price support of $10.10 per cwt of milk, hence would appear not to have the downward price 
flexibility of the 1985 fann bill. If a coreponsibility levy is imposed on producers to pay for surplus disposal costs, the impact c:oukl be 
similar to the 1985 fann bill 
4The estimates of gains from bGH used herein are considered to be the maximum after adjustments in marketing margins and fann 
programs. Benefits and required adjustment will be less if changes are less than assumed. 
It should be noted that the Sl billion gain to consumers from bGH remains a gain to the nation even if it is retained in part or 
whole by producers or the marketing sector. If it goes to producers because of support price rigidity, the impact would be to raise the price 
of land, cows, and other "r!Xed" assets. 
3 
Equity: Distribution of Benefits of bGH Among Consumers 
A given addition to income gives less satisfaction when received by the rich than by the poor, hence 
economic gains from bGH will be greater if its benefits are distn"buted toward low income than toward high 
income families. Table 1 assesses that issue (see Tweeten and Mlay for evidence of diminishing marginal utility 
of income). As noted earlier, the assumption based on estimates by Fallert et a/. is that cost is reduced 8 percent 
per pound of milk produced if bGH is used to the point where it brings an overall 15 percent increase in milk 
production. (Hallberg and Fallert (p. 14) also estimated that the price of milk would drop 8 percent, but from 
a 10 percent rightward shift in the supply curve for bGH.) 
Consumer expenditures survey results for 1985 obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BIS) 
permitted division of dairy product consumption into components for (1) fresh milk and cream and (2) other 
dairy products. In 1985, the farm share of consumer fluid milk expenditures was 49 percent; the figure for other 
dairy products was 36 percent (see Putnam; Dunham). These numbers were used to calculate the farm 
expenditure portion for dairy products by consumer income groups and the total of fluid milk and other dairy 
products was summed to obtain the total bGH contribution per household. 
Under 1985 base year assumptions, full utilization of bGH technology passed to consumers would save 
the average consuming unit $5.14 on fresh milk consumption and $3.89 on other dairy product consumption, for 
a total of $9.03 (Table 1). As a proportion of income, savings are much greater for low income than for high 
income families. For families with incomes under $5,000 per year, savings from bGH would be .23 percent of 
income. This is 11 times the percentage of income, .02, saved through bGH by families with incomes of $40,000 
or more per year. The ratio of percent of income saved for low income families compared to high income 
families is 11.0 for bGH, 85 for all food, and 1.0 for all goods and services including savings. Thus the 
distribution of benefits from bGH is much more equitable toward low income consumers than is the distnbution 
of efficiency gains from all food production or all income generation. It would be difficult indeed to fmd 
alternative high-payoff investments giving as high a proportion of benefits to low income families. What appears 
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Table 1. Consumer Gain from bGH by Income Level, 1985. 
Family Annual Income, $1,000 
Less $5 to $10 to $15 to $20 to $30 to $40 and 
All Units than $5 $10 $15 $20 $30 $40 Over 
Number of Consu111er Units (1,000) 91,4411 7,011 12,505 9,618 6.603 13,359 9,752 12,577 
Percent of Total 100.0 9.8 17.5 13.5 9.2 18.7 13.7 17.6 
Annual Income before Taxes $24,632 $2,086 $7,318 $12,272 $17,411 $24,331 $34,253 $60,519 
Size of Consumer Unit (Persons) 2.6 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.2 
Age of Reference Person (Years) 46.7 47.5 53.5 48.9 46.4 42.4 42.6 43.8 
Ratio of Earners to Children under 18 (Number) 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 
Average Annual Expenditure}> 
~ 
U1 Total Consumption $3,115.84 $1,547.00 $1,986.92 $2,539.68 $2,727.40 $3,241.16 $3,848.52 $5,271.16 Percent of lncomec 12.6 74.2 27.2 20.7 15.7 13.3 11.2 8.7 
Fresh Milk and Cream 
Total Consumption $131.04 $76.44 $108.16 $129.48 $124.80 $134.68 $164.32 $168.48 
Farm Portion (Dollars)d $64.21 $37.46 $53.00 $63.45 $61.15 $65.99 $80.52 $82.56 
bGH Contributiop (8% of Farm Portion, Dollars) $5.14 $3.00 $4.24 $5.08 $4.89 $5.28 $6.44 $6.60 
Percent of lncomec 0.021 0.144 0.058 0.041 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.011 
Other Dairy Products 
Total Consumption $135.20 $65.52 $88.92 $109.72 $117.00 $143.52 $177.84 $230.36 
Farm Portion (Dollars)0 $48.67 $23.59 $32.01 $39.50 $42.12 $51.67 $64.02 $82.93 
bGH Contribution (8% of Farm Portion, Dollars) $3.89 $1.89 $2.56 $3.16 $3.37 $4.13 $5.12 $6.63 
Percent of Incomec 0.016 0.090 0.035 0.026 0.019 0.017 O.ot5 0.011 
Total bGH Contribution 
Total (Dollars) $9.03 $4.89 $6.80 $8.24 $8.26 $9.41 $11.56 $13.23 
Percent of Incomec 0.037 0.234 0.093 0.067 0.047 0.039 0.034 0.022 
Corrected for Family Size (Dollars) $7.48 $8.42 $8.93 $8.95 $9.06 $10.02 $10.75 
Corrected for Marginal Utility and Size (Dollars) $9.90 $10.78 $10.96 $10.36 $10.04 $9.95 $9.43 
source: see text. 
• Components do not sum to total because of sample omissions. d Consumption multiplied by farm share of .49 in 1985. 
b Weekly expenditures multiplied by 52. • Consumption multiplied by farm share of .36 in 1985. 
c Percent of Income before taxes. 
small at the family level is not small in aggregate: as noted earlier bGH raises national income by 
approximately $1 billion per year when its full effects are considered.5 
Data at the top of Table 1 provide clues to characteristics of low income families. Many of 
lowest income families are one-person households. The relatively high age of the reference person in 
low income families implies a considerable number of aged population. Low income families also 
include a number of households with children -- as apparent from the ratio of earners to children under 
18 (Table 1). Whether the low income families are predominately aged persons or are young families 
with a disproportionate number of children, they can well benefit from lower dairy product prices made 
possible by bGH.6 
Some might contend that income transfers such as free school lunches, food stamp programs, 
and housing assistance are a better way than is bGH to serve equity objectives. A unique advantage of 
bGH is that it strongly serves both efficiency and equity. It is not possible to rely solely on transfer 
payments to assist the poor because there is "no free lunch"; someone must pay. When there is no "pie," 
the issue of how to divide it is academic. The ability to fund social assistance programs such as food 
stamps is made possibl~ only because of economic efficiency gains from technologies such as bGH. 
Two adjustments in Table 1 largely remove differences in bGH benefits among families. An 
adjustment to the average family size for the nation raises benefits for the lowest income families from 
$4.89 to $7.41. This contrasts with family-size-adjusted benefits from bGH for high income families of 
$10.75. An adjustment for marginal utility of income and the family-size brings bGH benefits per lowest 
income family up to $9.90 and for the highest income family down to $9.43 in Table 1 (see Tweeten and 
5Higher income families receive a larger absolute benefit than lower income families from bGH. The income gains of S4.89 for 
families earning less than $5,000 per year in 1985 appear to be small. Technologies such as bGH would have to occur ten-fold to improve 
the lot of families with incomes under $5,000 per year by just 2 percent annually. It is important to note that bGH is simply one of a 
substantial number of simultaneously occurring improvements in productivity. Withholding it does not necessarily require withholding any 
other technology that improves productivity, but one must ask why hold back bGH with such favorable economic equity and efficiency 
payoffs and not hold back other technoJog~es? 
6Benefits of bGH were also calculated for 1982-83 and 1984 based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data for those years. Results were 
surprisingly similar to those for 1985, indicating that benefits are not highly sensitive to the year chosen for analysis. 
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Mlay for utility function estimates). Thus low income families receive more absolute, utility-adjusted 
benefits than high income families from bGH.7 
Regional Impact 
According to estimates by Fallert et al., the Lake States and Northeast regions generally would 
have the highest rates of dairy cow and farm exits with introduction of bGH. Because of high 
production per cow and low production cost, the Pacific region would have a low rate of exit. Rising 
costs of irrigation water could accelerate exits from the Pacific region, however. The Com Belt, 
Southern Plains, and Appalachian regions would have moderate rates of exit. The Southeast, because 
it is favored by federal milk order price differentials and growing milk consumption, would have the 
lowest rate of exit. 
Recent results from Hallberg and Fallert give a different picture. They found that with bGH 
the share of milk produced in the upper Midwest and Northeast would increase while that of the Pacific, 
Northwest, and Southern Plains regions would decrease. 
Weersink and Tauer, based on a 16 percent increase in dairy productivity over trend, projected 
from 1988 to 2000 that the nation's share of milk production would increase 17 percent in the Pacific 
region, 8 percent in the Lake States, 5 percent in the Northeast, and would decline in other regions as 
a whole. Some evidence indicates bGH would strengthen comparative advantage in regions with the 
best management (Pacific), temperate-climate (not the South), and lowest current cow productivity 
(Corn Belt and Lake States). As with the above empirical studies, these predictions give mixed signals. 
In view of the conflicting fmdings, the conclusion is that differing regional impacts of bGH are too close 
to predict and will likely be of modest size. 
7 
While bGH research and development fundmg was presumed to be by private ftrms which in tum recover their costs through charges 
for the hormone paid by fanners, it is recognized that the public sector paid for some of the research. This is not accounted for in Table 
1. The net effect of adjusting data in Table 1 for public outlays to develop bGII cannot be determined but is likely to leave the results 
largely unchanged. 
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Minnesota and Wisconsin have legislated barriers to bGH motivated presumably by a desire 
to preserve family farms. That strategy could. backfire if other states adopt. Hallberg and Fallert (p. 
15) found that the market share of milk production in the Upper Midwest would fall markedly if bGH 
is rejected but would rise if bGH is adopted. 
Farm Size Impact 
Given the inelastic demand for dairy products, a 15 percent increase in milk per cow eventually 
would reduce the number of cows by nearly the same proportion. If bGH were scale neutral in its 
primary and secondary incidence, all sizes of farms would share equally in the 15 percent decline. 
In primary incidence, bGH is nearly scale-neutral. It is easily divisible and hence entails no 
sizable cost savings by spreading a high ftxed cost of a lumpy input over more units. It is rather simple 
to apply by hypodermic injection about once per month. It potentially can raise output per cow as much 
on a small farm as on a large farm. Perhaps that is one reason why Kinnucan et al. found no 
association between farm size and intended intensity of use as measured by the proportion of their dairy 
herds on which farmers planned to apply bGH, based on a survey of Southeast region farmers. Fallert 
and Blayney (p. 5) asserted that "On balance, it appears that bST is size neutral." 
Secondary economies of size arise because, even with primary scale-neutrality noted above, the 
more innovative, able managers who adopt bGH are on larger farms. Large farms have lower 
information acquisition costs per unit, can handle risk by, for example, experimenting on a reliable 
subsample of cows, and have a higher level of human capital to facilitate processing of information. 
These reasons help to explain why Kinnucan et a/. (p. 10) found that a higher proportion of large than 
of small farmers intended to adopt bGH. 
~r et al. reported a fairly modest impact of herd size on adoption rate but the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA, 1986, p. 131) assumed adoption rates of 10 to 20 percent for farms with 
less than $20,000 of sales and 80 to 90 percent for farms with over $500,000 of sales. I do not anticipate 
that adoption rates will differ this much among farm sizes but secondary scale effects clearly will favor 
' 
8 
adoption by larger farms. For that reason a 15 percent decrease in cow numbers may result in a 20 
percent reduction in dairy farm numbers. 
The difficulty of farming adjustments will depend on the time path of adoption. The OTA's 
projection of a 25.6 percent increase in milk production in three years implies rapid adoption. Fallert 
et al. assumed a 10-12 percent adoption rate in year 1, and rising to 45-70 percent by year 7, with the 
higher rates associated with higher prices. 
Buttel doubted adoption rates would be so rapid, noting that hybrid com took 10 years to 
achieve 95 percent adoption. Only 70 percent of the U.S. dairy herd was artificially inseminated four 
decades after commercial introduction of that superior management practice (Kloppenberg). If 10 
percent of farmers adopted bGH each year and each adopter increased milk output 18 percent, 
production would increase 1.8 percent per year due to bGH and the 15 percent expansion of output 
would be achieved in 8 years (80 percent adoption). 
Could farmers absorb this rate of expansion without economic trauma? Figure 2 shows that 
the rate of increase in milk output per cow was linear from 1950 to 1990 (see footnote a, Figure 2 for 
equation and adjusted R1 of .995). A linear expansion implies a declining geometric rate of growth. 
Trend rates of increase taken irom the well-fitting equation for Figure 2 were as follows: 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1995 (projected) 
Annual Growth in 
Milk Output/Cow 
(%) 
5.0 
3.3 
2.5 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5. 
Adding anticipated growth from bGH of 1.8 percent per year to the 1990 trend rate brings the total rate 
to 3.5 percent per year. This rate is well below the trend rate in 1950 and by 1995 would be equal to 
the 1960 rate. Hence introduction of bGH would fall well short of restoring the trend rates of the 
1950s. The number of farmers exiting agriculture in the 1990s will be few compared to the number who 
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left in the 1950s or 1960s. The expected decline in dairy farms from bGH is only .5 percent of the 3.5 
million dairy farm decline from 1950 to 1~- Because leavers will be a small fraction indeed of the 
total U.S.labor force, they will more readily fmd nonfarm job opportunities than did displaced farmers 
in early decades. 
Production per cow (1,000 lbeJ 
18~----~--~~--~------------------~ 
2 • Aotual - ""'dloted 
Figure 2. Actual and Predicted Milk Production per Cow, U.S., 1950 to 1990. 
a Regression is Y = -7096.65 + 237.581' Adj. R2 = .995 
(182.59) (2.57) 
where Y is pounds of milk per cow, T is last two digits of current year. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Family Farm Structure 
According to Comstock (p. 320), "Part of the problem with bGH is that it discriminates against 
small- and medium-size farmers, the same farmers who helped to pay for research on it." Private firms 
funded and conducted most of the bGH research and development. The public invested mainly in 
biomedical research. 
Of the small amount of public funds used to fund bGH research, what portion did small- and 
medium-size farmers contribute? Farmers receive much more income transfers than they pay in taxes 
for research. In fact, income tax receipts would increase by billions of dollars if the tax were removed 
from farmers (Sisson)! The farming industry's net tax writeoff has been smaller since tax reform in 
1986, but small- and medium-size farmers probably will continue to be a major net draw rather than 
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contributors to federal revenue. Farmers, of course, pay state sales and excise taxes contributing to 
research funding. But even if producers c.ontributed proportionately out of their income to fund 
research, mid- and small-size farms with under $250,000 of annual sales which account for only 1 percent 
of national income also would contribute 1 percent of taxes. Because nonfarmers fmance nearly the 
whole of public agricultural research, such nonfarmers as consumers deserve to receive benefits. 
Comstock (pp. 322, 323) speaks of an unwritten social contract between agricultural research 
institutions and the farmers who support them. "The farmers pay taxes that go for salaries and 
equipment; the institutions are supposed to deliver seeds, machines, and techniques that will make 
farming more productive and profitable for all kinds of farmers." Later (p. 325), he asserts that "The 
land-grant university system has not taken care to make sure its research is equally beneficial to all sizes 
of farms." The clear implication is that it should be equally beneficial to all sizes of farms. Because 
markets cause farm and food prices to fall (or to rise more slowly) as productivity rises, gains from 
public research eventually go to consumers and not to producers. 
Should research benefits go to producers? Adequate-size, reasonably well-managed farms have 
earned returns comparable to what their resources would earn elsewhere (see Tweeten, 1989, Ch. 4). 
It is difficult to make a case that farmers should be rewarded betttr for their resources than nonfarmers. 
Farmers as well as nonfarmers gain from technology as consumers. Farmers who are early adopters 
of successful technologies also gain. 
The estimated eventual reduction of dairy farms by 20 percent with adoption of bGH does not 
mean a like reduction in number of farms, farm families, or farm labor. Many former dairy farmers 
would become cash grain, beef, hog, or other types of farmers. Labor utilization would expand with 
greater milk production on many farms using bGH. Nevertheless, some dairy farm operators and 
workers would,.exit..f~ At issue, is whether they would be worse off. 
Growing number of studies indicate that most of those who left farming were not made worse 
off. Those who left as youth or retirees had relatively few adjustment problems. As for those who 
made mid-career adjustments, a recent study in Oklahoma indicates former farmers are better off on 
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subjective grounds (they say they are better off) and on objective grounds (they have better income, 
housing, access to services such as education, ~!c.). When former farmers were asked to "Compare your 
life now with your life while farming," replies were as follows (Perry, Schreiner, and Tweeten, p. 12): 
Much better off 
Somewhat better off 
About the same 
Somewhat worse off 
Much worse off 
(Percent) 
27 
24 
32 
6 
_jJ 
100. 
Fully 51 percent said they were much or somewhat better off compared to only 17 percent who said they 
are somewhat or much worse off-- a 3:1 ratio. These results support several studies in the 1960s and 
early 1970s summarized by Tweeten and Brinkman (see pp. 88-92). 
This is not to say that farm families making mid-career adjustments could not have been better 
prepared. Public programs of general education, counseling, job information, vocational-technical 
training, and other mobility assistance could reduce problems of adjusting to new employment. These 
programs could be financed from bGH benefits to society. 
Bovine Welfare 
Some (see Comstock) have argued that bGH will be cruel to cows because (1) daily injections 
cause pain, (2) the hormone will encourage confinement systems, (3) cows will "burn out" from stress 
on their biological system over several lactations, and (4) farmers will overdose bGH to produc~ more 
milk. These charges lack merit. 
The more than 11,000 cows studied in the United States alone since 1985 provide insights into 
the impact of bGH over several lactations and different management practices. Major findings include: 
L A successful prolonged-release system of bGH administration has increased milk 
production in treated cows by 20 percent. Injections are needed only once each 21 
days·rather than daily (CAST, p. 3). 
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2. Most dairy cattle today do not get their forage from pastures. Most are raised in 
confmement but milking p~lprs, free stalls, and open housing have replaced stantions 
on progressive farms. That situation is unlikely to be changed much by bGH. 
3. Cows administered bGH for four lactations gave similar milk responses each lactation 
(CAST, p. 3). No evidence of detrimental effects on cows was found through four 
lactations. In general, high producing cows have more disease problems than low 
producing cows. Among high producing cows the incidence of mastitis was no greater 
for cows receiving bGH. OTA (1991, p. 14) reports that bGH "does not produce 
adverse health effects on cows. • 
4. Farmers are unlikely to overdose bGH -- to do so would reduce profits. Successful 
commercial farm operators are well aware that poor care of cows will drive them out 
of business. Because poor managers and poor care of cows often go together, it 
follows that a reduction in numbers of inefficient operators because of bGH could 
leave milk production in the hands of producers attaining higher levels of animal 
welfare than do exiting producers. 
Product Safety 
Milk from cows administered bGH is safe for human consumption (OTA, 1991, p. 14). Bovine 
somatotropin or bGH, produced by the cow's pituitary gland, is found in all milk. Milk from bGH-
treated cows contains normal concentrations of bGH. The hormone is inactive in humans and is 
digested like any other protein. In addition, pasteurization deactivates 70 to 90 percent of bGH in milk 
(CAST, p. 3). Flavor, cholesterol concentration, and somatic cell counts are normal in milk from bGH-
treated cow.. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined by 1985 that milk produced by bGH-
treated cows is safe. On December 7, 1990, a panel of medical doctors and scientists convened by the 
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National Institutes of Health confU'Illed a December 1989 statement by the deputy director of the FDA: 
"BST [bGH] is one of the safest products we"-¥e ever looked at" (Those terrifying cows, p. A12). 
Yet in April 1990, the Governor of Wisconsin signed legislation to bar use of bGH until June 
1991; later this was extended another year. Minnesota enacted a similar ban. Several ice cream stores 
and five major grocery chains announced they will not market ice cream and milk produced by baH-
treated cows. A major reason is a campaign of distortion and vilification of recombinant bGH mounted 
by social activists. 
Other Criteria 
Comstock (p. 330) asks "At the environmental level, what is the cost in soils and water when 
fewer farmers, increasingly dependent on pesticides and herbicides, increase their holdings?" The 
implicit assumption is that small farms do less environmental damage than the remaining larger farms. 
The weight of empirical evidence contradicts that assumption. Small farms take poorer care of their 
land and use more nonrenewable energy fuels and agricultural chemicals per unit of output than do 
larger farms (Tweeten, Forthcoming). Society may have sound reasons to preserve small farms but 
protection of the environment and natural resources is not one of them. Improved productivity has 
freed millions of acres from crops for more environmentally benign use such as permanent pasture, 
recreation, forests, and wetlands. 
Conclusions 
Comstock (p. 333), drawing on Leopold states that "We should oppose only those technologies 
that unfairly advantage one social group over another, that displace workers at unacceptably high costs, 
or that threaten the stability, beauty, or integrity of the plant or animal kingdom." Later Comstock (p. 
333) writes "We do not want those [technologies] that are destabilizing, inhumane, or ugly .•• • 
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Taken seriously, such statements could stop any new technology! Concepts such as "unfairly 
advantage," "unacceptably high costs," and "integrity of the plant or animal kingdom" are vague and 
subjective. It is altogether proper that technologies be scrutinized for safety and other impacts before 
release. But appraisal must be on more objective terms than "ugly," "beauty," and "integrity." 
According to my analysis, application of bGH would: 
1. Reduce the real cost of milk production and milk prices, especially beneficial to low 
income consumers. Data indicate that bGH is an economically efficient technology 
whose benefits are far more equitably distributed than is all food or all goods and 
services. 
2. Reduce claims on natural resources through greater productivity of conventional 
resources. Thus bGH promotes an environmentally sound food and agriculture system. 
3. Keep the U.S. dairy industry competitive with industries elsewhere and with products 
such as beverages and desserts which compete with dairy products. This will be 
especially needful and beneficial if the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade result in liberalized trade, making the dairy 
industry a competitive global market. 
4. Free labor and other resources in agriculture for use in other activities such as 
education, health, or recreation where they are valued more highly by society. 
Introduction of bGH would encourage less efficient dairy farms to become more 
efficient or find opportunities in other parts of the farm or nonfarm economy. The 
structural impact on farm sizes and numbers would be very small compared to the 
milking machine or tractor. 
A nation's economic vitality depends on its capacity for renewal. In a dynamic, growing 
economy, profitable and productive new inputs, practices, and technologies continually replace the 
unprofitable and the unproductive. Individuals and firms that are innovative, imaginative, or lucky drive 
out those which are unimaginative, unmotivated, or unlucky. Nations (East Europe provides excellent 
15 
recent examples) which would avoid this process stagnate, falling ever further behind in the competitive 
process that has lifted mankind from the cave to lives of better nutrition, health, self-realization, and 
self-fulfillment. 
The farming industry's capacity for self-renewal is apparent from farm entry and exit data. 
Comstock (p. 325) creates an image of doom when he notes that "In 1986, 6 percent of all farmers went 
out of business; one farm every four minutes. In 1985, the figure was 5 percent." He did not note that 
these are gross exits. Half of these exits were aged farmers who retired or died. In the farm financial 
crisis years 1982 to 1987, the annual entrance of new farm operators averaged nearly 4 percent of all 
farm operators. New farm entrants outnumbered mid-career exits nearly 2:1. The overall farming 
population dropped only 1.4 percent annually on average in those difficult years of 1982 to 1987 (Bureau 
of the Census). 
A society pressed to pay off debts or to fund education, infrastructure, and a host of other high 
priority needs can ill afford to tum down a technology that ·is safe and equitable while adding nearly $1 
billion per year to national income. Foregoing that benefit may be regarded as the cost of preserving 
family farms. 
Based on the assumption that the adjustment to bGH would occur over 8 years, an estimated 
2,247 farms or .1 percent of all U.S. farms would be lost each year to bGH.8 The value of all future 
benefits discounted at 5 percent would be $8.9 billion or $500,000 per displaced farm. Thus, by adopting 
bGH, consumers could pay each displaced farmer $500,000 and be no worse off. 
Failure to utilize bGH imposes an annual implicit tax of $9 per average family. If public policy 
imposed an explicit tax of $9 per year on every family consuming dairy products, the howl of protest 
8Assuming a S percent discount rate and that bGH has the same 16-year length of life as the average of other agricultural 
technologies (see Braha and Tweeten), the discounted present value of bGH is $8,949 million from annual benefits of $826 million. 
Assuming bGH causes exit of 20 percent of the 138,311 dairy farms (Bureau of the Census) and that 35 percent of these shift to cash grain 
or other types of farms (see Perry, Schreiner, and Tweeten), then 17,980 dairy farms or 1 percent of all U.S. farms would be lost to bGH. 
Decoupled payments or adjustment assistance of $497,712 ($8,949 million f 17,980 farms) could be made per farm lost to compensate for 
damages. 
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from (properly) outraged social activists would be deafening. But to consumers, the impact of an 
implicit or explicit tax is the same. 
To previous knowledge that bGH is safe and economically efficient, this study adds that bGH 
is about as equitable in distributing benefits to low-income consumers and about as scale-neutral in 
preserving farms as technology gets. If the nation does not pursue safe and efficient new technologies 
such as bGH, it eventually will lack the resources to support environmental and other worthy social 
goals. 
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